The Place Of The Psyche In A Constructed World by Gergen, Kenneth J.
Swarthmore College
Works
Psychology Faculty Works Psychology
12-1-1997
The Place Of The Psyche In A Constructed World
Kenneth J. Gergen
Swarthmore College, kgergen1@swarthmore.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Works by
an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth J. Gergen. (1997). "The Place Of The Psyche In A Constructed World". Theory And Psychology. Volume 7, Issue 6. 723-746.
http://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology/321
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258190640
The	Place	of	the	Psyche	in	a	Constructed	World
ARTICLE		in		THEORY	&	PSYCHOLOGY	·	DECEMBER	1997
Impact	Factor:	0.7	·	DOI:	10.1177/0959354397076001
CITATIONS
63
READS
55
2	AUTHORS,	INCLUDING:
Kenneth	J.	Gergen
Swarthmore	College
278	PUBLICATIONS			11,202	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Available	from:	Kenneth	J.	Gergen
Retrieved	on:	05	April	2016
Draft copy for Theory and Psychology, 1997, 7, 31-36.
The Place of the Psyche in a Constructed World  
Kenneth J. Gergen 
Interest in the family of ideas loosely labeled "social constructionist" has burgeoned 
within recent years, and now spans the full range of the social sciences and 
humanities. Constructionist scholarship has been devoted to understanding the 
generation, transformation, and suppression of what we take to be objective 
knowledge; exploring the literary and rhetorical devices by which meaning is 
achieved and rendered compelling; illuminating the ideological and valuational 
freighting of the unremarkable or taken for granted; documenting the implications of 
world construction for the distribution of power; gaining an appreciation of the 
processes of relationship from which senses of the real and the good are achieved; 
comprehending the historical roots and vicissitudes of various forms of 
understanding; and exploring the range and variability in human intelligibility across 
cultures. It is to charting the course of this work that I devoted much of my book, 
Realities and Relationships (Gergen, 1994). Yet, while provoking lively interest 
across the academic sphere, psychologists themselves have been relatively resistant 
to joining the constructionist dialogues. Social constructionism is virtually absent 
from the common discussions of mental functioning and dysfunction within the field. 
There are many reasons for the general insularity of psychological science from this 
intellectual watershed. Certainly among the most important is what many take to be a 
fundamental antagonism between the psychological and constructionist projects. 
Within traditional psychology, mental processes are not only the chief subject of 
inquiry, but serve as the critical fulcrum for explaining human action. For social 
constructionism, in contrast, the chief locus of understanding is not in "the psyche" 
but in social relationships. All that psychology traces to mental origins, 
constructionists might wish to explain through micro social process. If the 
psychological project were fully vindicated, there would be no explanatory 
remainder, a world of human action for which social constructionism would be a 
necessary adjunct. The reverse seems equally as plausible: the vindication of 
constructionism would portend the end of psychology. 
However, this dolorous conclusion is not wholly inevitable. It is favored primarily by 
a realist metaphysics and a correspondence view of language, both of which sustain a 
view of science in which there is a single, knowable reality, and in which theories 
compete for explanatory and predictive superiority. It is this view of science that, 
historically, has fostered a recurring pattern of internecine antagonism, in which 
behaviorism functioned to eradicate mentalism, and cognitivism has since served to 
silence behaviorist voices. However, constructionist scholars are not typically drawn 
either to a realist metaphysics or a correspondence theory of language. For the 
constructionist there is no justification for foundational enunciations of the real; 
whatever we take to be essential is an outcome of social interchange. Theories cannot 
be falsified by virtue of their correspondence with something else called "the real," 
but only within the conventions of particular enclaves of meaning. Thus 
constructionists establish no transcendent grounds for eliminating any theoretical 
formulation. Thus, to eradicate a theoretical perspective would not only be 
tantamount to losing a mode of human intelligibility (along with related social 
practices), but to silence a community of meaning making. Within a constructionist 
metaphysics it would be virtually impossible to locate grounds for such suppression, 
and indeed many would argue that there is implicit in constructionism a strong 
pluralist ethic (see, for example, Sampson, 1993). 
Given a constructionist metatheory, how are we then to view professional 
investments in psychological research, as well as mental health practices, public 
policy advisories, and other practices based on ontologies of mental process? If not 
eradication, what role is the ontology of the mind to play in a constructionist 
orientation to human action? Or conversely, what place is there in psychology for 
social constructionism? It is here that the constructionist concern with the pragmatics 
of language usage becomes paramount. For the constructionist language serves 
neither as a picture or a map of what is the case; rather (following Wittgenstein, 
1953), it acquires its meaning from its use within human interchange (which usages 
may also include a "game of reality positing.") From this standpoint, any analysis of 
scientific or scholarly accounts of the world would primarily (though not exclusively) 
be concerned with the uses to which such languages are put. Within what kinds of 
relationships do they play an important role, and what are the repercussions of 
particular forms of language use for those who directly or indirectly participate in 
these relationships? There can be no canonical slate of criteria for evaluating such 
appraisals, as various communities will share different concerns, which may 
themselves change with time and circumstance. And too, the way such questions are 
addressed and answered must itself be viewed as a byproduct of a community, 
neither lodged within nor answered with respect to "the real," but reflecting 
community investments and conventions of the time. This is scarcely to discredit 
such inquiry; one can scarcely do more than raise questions of the real and the good 
within particular traditions. Rather, it is to open scholarly and scientific discourse to 
the full range of relevant communities (see also Feyerabend, 1978), without granting 
any community an ultimate "grounds of assessment" by virtue of which other voices 
may be silenced. 
Within this context I wish to consider three major orientations to psychological 
inquiry as informed by constructionist metatheory. These orientations may be 
distinguished in terms of their evaluative posture. The specific attempt will be first to 
delineate the logics of these prevailing and emerging orientations, and then to inquire 
into their potentials. We have, then, a two-tiered analysis, first treating psychological 
inquiry from contrasting constructionist standpoints, and then reflecting on the 
standpoints themselves. The first of these orientations, which emphasizes 
denaturalization, reflection and democratization, is at once the most fully developed 
within the constructionist arena and the most fully critical of existing psychological 
scholarship. At the same time its positive potentials for psychology have not been 
sufficiently addressed. The second orientation, revitalization and enrichment, is far 
more positive in its orientation to psychological inquiry. Although it is the least 
developed, its elaboration seems critical to the future of the discipline. Finally, I wish 
to explore constructionist efforts to remove certain problematic features from the 
compendium of mental predicates, and to reconstruct the discourse in more 
promising ways. This social reconstructive effort has dramatically accelerated in 
recent years, but its internal tensions and broader ramifications have not heretofore 
been addressed. Through this analysis, we may emerge with a more variegated 
understanding of the relationship between psychological and constructionist 
endeavors, an appreciation of affinities and interdependencies of traditional and 
constructionist approaches to psychology, and an enhanced sense of humility 
regarding all adventures in making meaning. 
Denaturalization, Reflection and Democratization 
There are reasons other than hegemonic threat for the failure of most psychologists to 
join the broader dialogues on the social constitution of knowledge. Among them is 
surely the critical posture of much constructionist scholarship to date - an impulse 
that seems aimed at dismantling the authority of psychological science. Further, 
because of the restricted forms of argumentation within the empirical wing of 
psychology, with rare exception (cf. Held, 1995), its denizens have been at a loss to 
answer these assaults. Neither insights into methodology and statistics, nor recourse 
to "established fact" - favored moves within traditional empiricist argumentation - 
count as legitimate rejoinders to forms of constructionist critique. Yet, critical 
constructionism is not "all of a piece;" differing arguments are at stake. In order to 
appreciate the force of these critical efforts, along with their potentials and 
shortcomings, it is important to distinguish among them. Although convergent, they 
rest on three distinct lines of reasoning: ideological unmasking, rhetorical 
deconstruction, and social analysis. 
In the case of ideological unmasking, constructionist critics point to the societal 
ramifications of psychology's modes of describing and explaining human action. As 
professional accounts are disseminated within the culture, bearing the stamp of 
scientific authority, so do they inform people's actions and instruct social policy. In 
Foucault's (1980) terms, there is a close relationship between claims to knowledge 
and cultural power. Given the capacity of the profession to generate multiple and 
diverse accounts of the person, choices in description and explanation are thus 
matters of moral and political consequence. Within this context professional 
psychology becomes a prime target of critique, criticism exacerbated further by the 
profession's seemingly disingenuous claims to value neutrality. Thus, constructionist 
scholars have variously set out to demonstrate the ways in which existing 
psychological accounts (and the practices which they sustain), lend themselves to 
broadening governmental control (Rose, 1990), destroying democratic foundations 
(1984), promoting narcissism (Wallach and Wallach, 1983), championing 
individualist ideology (Sampson,1977; Fowers and Richardson, 1996), eroding 
community (Bellah et al, 1985; Sampson, 1977), fostering racism (Jones, 1991), 
sustaining the patriarchal order (Hare-Mustin and Marecek,1988; M. Gergen, 1988; 
Morawski,1994), contributing to western colonialism (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, and 
Misra, 1996), and more. 
This form of critique contrasts sharply with literary and rhetorical deconstruction. 
Representing a convergence of developments within Continental semiotics, post-
structural literary theory, and rhetorical studies, it is reasoned in this case that all 
sensible propositions about persons are lodged within broader systems of meaning. In 
large measure, the intelligibility of any proposition is derived from its placement 
within this system as opposed to its referential relationship to non-linguistic 
occurrences (e.g. My ability to construct intelligible sentences about the nature of 
"love" depends primarily on a textual history as opposed to observations of "the 
phenomenon itself.") Rhetoricians add importantly to this concern with the textually 
driven character of psychological discourse by demonstrating the manner in which 
such discourse is constrained or fashioned by its function in social interchange. Here 
it is argued that descriptions and explanations of mental life are importantly 
dependent on the demands placed on the rhetor to achieve intelligibility ("to 
persuade") a particular audience (e.g. The language required to render "love" 
intelligible to a child, as opposed to a romantic partner, a priest, or a New Guinea 
tribesman would be radically different). In this case, intelligibility is often traced to 
various rhetorical tropes, such as narrative or metaphor. For example, regardless of 
"the data," in giving an account of human development the investigator cannot escape 
the demands of "proper story telling." 
In this context of argument, the problem of professional psychology does not lie in its 
discursive commitments per se, but in its claims to objective grounding for such 
commitments. Truth claims, it is reasoned, operate to silence competing voices; the 
discourse of objectivity and political totalitarianism are allied. The constructionist 
critic thus functions to unmask the literary and rhetorical strategies responsible for 
the sensibility (objectivity, intelligibility, felicity) of propositions about the mental 
world. An early example of such unmasking is provided by Smedslund's (1978) 
attempted to demonstrate that most experimental hypotheses in psychology are non-
falsifiable inasmuch as falsifications are linguistically incoherent. Similarly, I have 
argued that all propositions relating mental predicates to an external world (either 
stimulus or response) are circular; their intelligibility rests on implicit tautologies 
(Gergen, 1987, see also Wallach and Wallach, 1994). More broadly, scholars have 
variously argued that theories of the mind grow not from observation (inductively) 
but are derived from prevailing metaphors (see, for example, Gigerenzer, 1996; 
Soyland, 1994) and on cultural conventions of narrative or story telling (Sarbin, 
1986; Gergen and Gergen, 1986). They have variously explored how "the facts" 
cognitive dysfunction ("irrationality") are created through rhetorical tropes (Lopes, 
1991), how the APA Publication Manual sustains implicit assumptions about human 
action (Bazerman, 1988), and such manuals circumscribe forms of communication 
and relationships - both within the profession and between the profession and the 
culture at large (Budge and Katz, 1995). 
A third logic of constructionist critique, the social-analytic, is stimulated by 
significant developments within the sociology of knowledge and the history of 
science. Here scholars have been particularly concerned with the ways in which 
social processes shape the profession's assumptions about its subject matter, its 
methodologies, and ultimately its conclusions regarding the nature of the world (see, 
for example, Kuhn,1962; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). For psychology, the significant 
argument is that it is through social negotiation that investigators determine the 
grounding assumptions within which research will occur. Once the grounding 
assumptions (paradigms) have gained consensus, then all interpretations of evidence 
will necessarily serve as support; paradigms are not thus "tested" against fact; they 
determine what will be counted as fact. Informed by these developments, the critical 
analyst shares the previously voiced concerns with the unwarranted and totalitarian 
claims of scientific psychology to accurate and objective readings of the mind. 
Unmasking the social processes intrinsic to the production of "scientific truth" serves 
the additional function of challenging longstanding boundaries within the discipline. 
Because of traditional commitments to truth through method, there are strong 
tendencies for the sub-disciplines to become insulated and self-serving, thus 
absenting themselves from broader dialogic engagement - both within the academy 
and the society more generally. Social critique thus serves as a catalyst for broader 
interchange. 
The social critique in psychology gained early sustenance from both 
ethnomethodological explorations of the social negotiation of factuality - for 
example, of suicide (Garfinkel, 1967) and gender (Kessler and McKenna, 1978) - and 
labeling theories of deviance (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). Investigators have since 
gone on to explore the social construction of a large array of "mental processes," 
including cognitive processes (Coulter, 1979), anger (Averill, 1982), emotion (Harre, 
1986), schizophrenia (Sarbin and Mancuso, 1980), child development (Bradley, 
1989), sexuality (Tiefer, 1992), anorexia and bulimia (Gordon, 1990), and depression 
(Wiener and Marcus, 1994). This line of critique has also been augmented by broad-
ranging scholarship attempting to locate the historical and cultural contexts within 
which assumptions about psychological processes emerge. In the case of historical 
work, scholars have variously been concerned with the social contexts giving rise, for 
example, to people's constructions of foul and fragrant smells (Corbin, 1986), mental 
development (Kirschner, 1996), multiple personality disorder (Hacking, 1995), 
boredom (Spacks, 1995), and the subject in psychological research (Danziger, 
1995).1 Cultural anthropologists have explored the cultural embeddedness of various 
conceptions of the mind (see, for example, Heelas and Lock, 1981; Lutz, 1988; 
Bruner, 1990). In effect, by tracing taken for granted beliefs about the mind to local 
circumstances, the linked presumptions in the science of a "universal subject matter," 
singular methodology, and universal generalization are all placed in jeopardy. 
At the outset, these three lines of critical scholarship (often working in tandem) pose 
a formidable threat to traditional empirical psychology. With the empirical grounding 
for professional truth claims undermined, so is the rationale for traditional research, 
along with the profession's claims to authority within the culture more generally. 
Further, the critics themselves have often contributed to the sense of an impending 
elimination of psychological inquiry. The titles of works edited by Parker and his 
colleagues, for example, Deconstructing social psychology (Parker and Shotter, 
1990), and Deconstructing psychopathology (Parker, et al., 1995) are apposite. 
However, such a funereal conclusion is without warrant. As earlier proposed, there is 
nothing within constructionist premises that necessarily argue for the elimination of 
any form of discourse. While constructionist critiques may often appear nihilistic, 
there is no means by which they themselves can be grounded or legitimated. They too 
fall victim to their own modes of critique; their accounts are inevitably freighted with 
ethical and ideological implications, forged within the conventions of writing, 
designed for rhetorical advantage, and their "objects of criticism" constructed within 
and for a particular community. The objects of their criticism are no less constructed 
than the traditional objects of research, nor do their moral claims rest on 
transcendental foundations. 
There is more: Even by constructionist standards, a rationale for empirical research 
can be generated. One of the central arguments within constructionist metatheory is 
that language is not mimetic: That is, it fails to function as a picture or map of an 
independent world. Rather, it is reasoned, language operates performatively and 
constitutively; it is employed by communities of interlocutors for purposes of 
carrying out their relationships - including the local constitution of the real and the 
good. As I have argued elsewhere (Gergen, 1994), such a view does not obliterate 
empirical science; it simply removes its privilege of claiming truth beyond 
community. There is nothing in constructionist arguments, for example, that would 
call for an end to medical research. The constructionist would simply point out that 
its ontological categories along with the identification of "sickness" and "cure" must 
not be viewed as transcendentally accurate, but as byproducts of historically and 
culturally located, ideologically invested conversation, serving particular social 
functions. In the same way, psychologists may properly employ conceptions of 
mental process in empirical research, and indeed such research may be used to 
supplement processes of prediction within other sectors of the culture (for example, 
prediction of voting patterns, juror's preferences, or the rate of suicide). The 
constructionist claim is chiefly that there is no foundation for the addendum "is true" 
to the language used in these endeavors. Secondarily constructionism invites 
discussion of the political/ethical messages carried by the methods of research 
themselves (see, for example, Morawski, 1988). 
As we find, the critical voice of the constructionist should not be viewed as 
liquidating. Rather, these lines of critical scholarship serve the useful functions of 
denaturalization and democratization. In their denaturalizing the "objects of 
research," along with methodologies, research reports, statistics, and resulting 
practices, critical inquiry first invites an appropriate humility. They function to curb 
the presumptuous claims to unbridled generality, truth beyond culture and history, 
and fact without interpretation, which have generated broad skepticism within the 
culture more generally, and yielded scorn more globally from those failing to share 
the premises. Simultaneously, such critiques function as a continuous invitation to the 
psychologist to avoid the blinders of the singular explanation, and to expand the 
range of interpretive possibilities available to the profession and the culture. All that 
seems "clearly the case," could be otherwise. We shall return to this issue shortly. 
In addition to the advantages of denaturalization, these forms of critique also favor a 
pluralist politics, both within the profession and with respect to the profession's 
relationship to its many publics. They operate to "level the playing field" within the 
profession, for example offering humanists, phenomenologists, feminists, and the 
spiritual, the same right to reason and results as behaviorists and cognitivists. They 
also open the profession to multiple voices from the culture more generally. Where 
psychology had largely been deaf to ethical and ideological misgivings concerning its 
conceptions, methods, and societal effects, critical scholarship welcomes such 
inquiry into the professional forum. This pluralization of voices is especially 
important, inasmuch as the assumptions of empirical psychology offer no means of 
self-examination save through their own premises. Finally, efforts to denaturalize and 
democratize invite a dialogic relationship between the profession and its many 
publics, forms of interchange that should not only serve to render professional work 
more intelligible, but enhance the applicability of professional work for the public 
good. In effect, when its threatening rhetoric is removed, we find constructionist 
critique serves to strengthen psychological inquiry in significant degree. 
Revitalization and Enrichment 
As I have argued, there is nothing within a constructionist metatheory that necessarily 
militates against empirical work in psychology. By the same token, constructionism 
itself does not prohibit the entry of any term into the lexicon of mental life. In this 
sense, critics of constructionism who complain of its tendencies to denigrate or 
obliterate the self (Osbeck, 1993; Harre and Krausz, 1996), or agency and uniqueness 
(Fisher, 1995), or to privilege the social over the material (Michael, 1996), mistake 
the metatheoretical orientation for a foundational ontology. Constructionist 
metatheory neither denies nor affirms the existence of any such "entities" or 
"processes." The question is not the existence of the putative referents of various 
explanatory or descriptive terms; constructionism simply obviates issues of 
fundamental ontology in favor of questions about interpretive functioning within 
communities. In the same way, psychology's traditional discourses of cognition, 
emotion, motivation, and mental disorder and the like, are not antagonistic to 
constructionist metatheory. Rather, for the constructionist, these are simply 
representative forms of constructing the person within an evolving professional 
community, forms that bear a close and interdependent relationship with common 
modes of discourse within contemporary culture (see for example, Cushman, 1995). 
For the professional psychologist, mental discourses have a high degree of 
communicative utility. Indeed, without shared discourses of this kind there would be 
nothing to intelligibly call "a profession." However, given the legitimacy of a 
tradition valued by its constituents in this way, constructionist metatheory does invite 
a range of provocative deliberations. Among them, what forms of psychological 
discourse are to be favored, and for what purposes? For whom are these languages 
useful and for what kinds of projects? Do current investments primarily benefit the 
constituents of the professional community; are they possibly injurious to the 
recipients of such designations? To the extent that professional discourse is 
appropriated by the culture, what kinds of policies, institutions, or individual actions 
are favored? What forms of cultural life are rendered invisible or obliterated? And, 
given the potential of such discourses to contribute to societal transformation, what 
new or revived forms of discourse are invited? 
It is in this domain of dialogue that we locate a second major orientation to 
psychological inquiry favored by a constructionist standpoint. While deliberations on 
the utility of current pursuits is essential, constructionism also frees the investigator 
to suspend the taken for granted ontologies of the profession. The impetus toward 
univocality ("unified psychology") is modulated. With the bounds of interpretation 
thus expanded, the scholar is invited to explore the penumbra of emerging 
intelligibility, forms of possible but unrealized articulation. I am not speaking here of 
a myopic accumulation of "psychobabble," but rather, of the careful and caring 
development of psychological discourse keyed to specific cultural (moral/political) 
ends. If psychological language is used by persons for carrying on cultural life, then 
new forms of language invite alternative futures. Alternative conceptions of mental 
may favor forms of life more promising to many people than the currently obvious 
and unquestioned. In this case the scholar abandons the problematic role of 
describing "what is the case," and sets out to forge languages favoring what may 
become. Detached observation gives way to what we may view as a poetic activism. 
Yet, while constructionism removes the weight of existing ontologies, movement into 
meaning can scarcely proceed outside the traditions of any community. A discourse 
created outside the textual histories of any culture would not only fail to 
communicate, there would be no practices to which it was relevant. No cultural work 
would be achieved. It is in this respect that so much of the discourse generated within 
isolated academic enclaves is elsewhere discredited as "mere jargon." In effect, the 
construction of new meanings must draw from extant traditions without duplicating 
them. It is useful here to consider the potentials for discursive enrichment as drawing 
first on traditions within the home culture (historical archeology) and second, on 
alterior traditions (cultural exegesis). 
At the outset, the challenge of discursive enrichment places a premium on sustaining 
the various traditions in psychology that have otherwise been suppressed by the 
dominant discourses. For example, the humanist tradition has been largely ignored 
within the major texts of the profession. Yet, while problematic in its dualism and its 
individualism, the demise of the humanist language of intention serves as a threat to 
cherished cultural institutions (e.g. democracy, ethics). Similarly, while 
phenomenological theory was virtually obliterated with the early rise of behaviorism, 
abandoning the language of subjective experience removes from the culture a 
significant reason for valuing human life. The resuscitation of these languages in 
terms of contemporary theoretical and cultural dialogues - humanist on the one hand 
(see for example, Rychlak, 1988), and phenomenological on the other (see for 
example, Polkinghorne, 1988) - seems a highly valuable undertaking. Similarly, a 
vital expansion of resources is represented in the attempt by psychologists to revive 
the hermeneutical tradition (cf.Messer, Sass, and Woolfolk, 1988; Addison and 
Packer, 1989), once essential to the very concept of psychology as a 
Geisteswissenschaft. Hermeneutical deliberations serve the valuable function of 
thwarting the modes of depersonalization so common to the empirical research 
tradition. 
I find much to be credited, as well, in work that draws from our traditions in such a 
way as to expand the range of "valuing discourse." The psychological profession has 
been so captivated by the instrumentalist ethos and its emphasis on problem solving, 
that its primary offering to the culture has been a discourse of deficit (Gergen, 1994, 
Chpt. 6). The massive and ever-expanding terminologies of mental illness, for 
example, all function as means of placing social identity at risk. As the discourse is 
placed into action, it discredits, divides and distances. Vitally needed, then, are 
discourses inviting people into more valued modes of being, ways of constructing 
self and others that add to the sense of well-being and human welfare. Among the 
important contributions of this kind I would place early attempts to reconstruct 
women's psychology in a more empowering register (Gilligan, 1982; Belenky, et al. 
1986), Lifton's (1993) conception of the protean self as a source of resilience, 
Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) construction of the "flow" experience, and the emerging 
interest in wisdom (Sternberg, 1990). In spite of their realist predelictions, in each 
case the theorists draw from traditions outside the mechanistic - and sustain and 
enrich languages that invest persons with special gifts, potentials and powers. 
Other work disposed toward the positive register is more directly informed by 
constructionist metatheory. Here scholars are less likely to delineate a specific mode 
of psychological being, as they are to argue for expanding possibilities of 
constructing self and others. For example, Averill and Nunley (1992), in a volume 
intended for a non-academic readership, argue for the possibility of leading an 
"emotionally creative" life, one that takes into account the socially grounded 
character of emotional expression. In their volume, Constructing the Life Course 
Gubrium, Holstein and Buckholdt (1994) abandon the traditional view of epigenetic 
trajectories of development, and explore the possibilities for collaborative 
construction of individual futures. This same orientation toward the creative use of 
construction now pervades a large domain of therapeutic theory and practice (see for 
example, White and Epston, 1990; Weingarten, 1991; McNamee and Gergen, 1993; 
Anderson, 1996). 
These are but a sampling of illustrations of the way in which scholars can draw from 
existing cultural dialogues to crystallize ontologies of the person, intelligibilities that 
are more fully "actionable" than the formalisms of the academy, and which explicitly 
carry with them implications for cultural transformation. The potentials for such 
poetic activism have scarcely been explored. Spiritual traditions, for example, are 
enormously important within the culture, but have been generally eliminated from the 
psychologist's vocabulary. Further, the range of actionable vocabulary and narrative 
should be enriched by alterior traditions, from textual histories beyond the West. 
Slowly we begin to realize the potentials of Indian writings on the mind (see for 
example, Paranjpe, 1984), Confucianist conceptions of self (Tu Wei-ming, 1985), 
and Mestizo concepts of the person and mental health (Ramirez, 1983). This process 
of cross-fertilization is but in a fledgling state, and much to be welcomed from a 
constructionist perspective. 
As we see, the second orientation to psychological inquiry favored by 
constructionism stresses the resuscitation and refurbishment of psychological 
intelligibilities for purposes of augmenting the discursive resources of the culture. 
The attempt, then, is to enrich psychology in ways that may favor positive 
transformations of society. Yet, in the same way that we found limits to 
constructionist critique, a reflexive moment is also required in the present case. Three 
issues demand particular attention. At the outset, the present proposal may smack of 
the disingenuous. If constructionism abolishes all foundations or ultimate warrants 
for propositions about persons, the critic may advance, then wouldn't subsequent 
attempts to "describe and explain" - as in the above - stand empty ("mere words"), or 
worse, operate as forms of propaganda? Why should the psychologist engage in such 
efforts? And, what difference would there be between the psychologist's 
pronouncements on "flow," "protean potentials," "wisdom" and the like and the 
priest's accounts of god or the spiritual life? In reply, there would be little reason for 
the constructionist scholar to plump for these intelligibilities on any foundational 
grounds. The accounts of the person would not be favored because they "are true," 
but rather, because as intelligible interpretations they offer significant options for 
action. The theorist need not suffer the loss of confidence, nor the self-loathing 
accompanying duplicity, any more in speaking of "psychological process" than in 
calling a "foul ball" at a baseball game, or declaring child molesting evil within 
his/her community. Confidence and the sense of authenticity are born of communal 
participation as opposed to grounding in "the true," or "the real." In this sense 
psychological theory is no more or less true than spiritualism or physics. Cultural 
intelligibilities sprout in many soils. However, the tradition of mental accounting is a 
rich and significant one, in many ways pivotal for the major institutions of the West. 
The importance of considered, creative and communal attention to its further 
elaboration can scarcely be overestimated. 
The second problem concerns the problematic traces of pragmatism implied by the 
present arguments, and most pointedly the instrumentalist interpretation of 
pragmatism. As I have argued, constructionism invites the scholar to consider the 
societal utility of psychological theory, and bring into being conceptions favoring 
certain social ends as opposed to others. This would seem to thrust the theorist into 
the role of grand strategist, attempting to provide tools to the society for constructing 
itself in the image favored by the theorist. The theorist functions instrumentally to 
create desirable effects in the social world. Yet, while allying itself with the 
pragmatist tradition, the instrumentalist conception of the pragmatic is not a 
congenial companion to constructionism. The instrumentalist view is largely an 
outgrowth of individualism, and most particularly, the assumption that individuals 
are rational and autonomous decision makers operating to achieve their personal 
goals. However, constructionism not only fails to objectify the person as a rational 
agent, but when its conceptual implications are extended it favors a view of human 
action quite at odds with the traditional view. Although we shall treat this view 
shortly, the important point in this context is to appreciate the difference between a 
constructionist and an instrumentalist concept of the pragmatic. Constructionism's 
particular emphasis is on meaningful action embedded not within individual minds 
but within more extended patterns of interchange. Thus, meaningful action is always 
consequential in the sense of bearing an interdependent relationship between what 
preceded and what follows. By virtue of convention, one's actions thus sustain and/or 
suppress that which has been, and simultaneously function to create a present with 
future ramifications. Precisely what these "ramifications" are is open to continuous 
negotiation, which negotiation itself functions pragmatically in this more relational 
sense (see also Botschner, 1995). 
Finally, the critic might locate within these proposals a "transformationist bias," that 
is, a continuous championing of the new, the expanded and the revolutionary as 
opposed to the accepted, the traditional, and secure. Surely this is the dominant 
subtext of the above. However, this bias must be seen against the backdrop of the 
current context, both intellectual and cultural. To the extent that western psychology 
is largely a child of cultural modernism (Gergen, 1991), and cultural modernism has 
achieved broad ascendance - its premises now grounding most of the culture's major 
institutions - then a psychology that simply contributes to the status quo has little to 
offer the culture. It functions as an elfin voice in a mighty chorus. Constructionism 
itself is not antithetical to tradition; indeed, tradition is essential to the construction of 
all meaning. However, to the extent that one wishes to participate in a profession that 
plays a significant role in augmenting or expanding or augmenting the culture's 
resources, constructionist arguments can lend strong support. In effect, there seems 
less to be gained in the present era through duplication of longstanding 
intelligibilities as opposed to catalytic conceptualization. 
The Social Reconstruction of the Mind 
There is a third orientation to psychological theorizing advanced by constructionist 
writings, an orientation to which the preceding arguments serve as important 
antecedents. As we have seen, significant criticism has been directed toward 
traditional psychology for its implicit support of individualist ideology and 
institutions. As it is variously reasoned, tracing human action to psychological 
sources sustains a view of persons as fundamentally isolated, self-gratifying, and self-
sufficient. From the traditional standpoint, relationships are artificial byproducts of 
otherwise autonomously functioning individuals; the social is secondary to and 
derivative of the personal. As such conceptions are played out in cultural life, critics 
argue, they naturalize alienation, self-absorption, and a conflict of all against all. 
Coupled with this critique, however, is the second logic developed above, namely 
that a major aim of scholarship from the constructionist standpoint should be the 
enrichment of cultural resources. In particular, through the development of new 
ontologies, alternative and possibly more promising avenues of action within the 
culture may be opened. As these lines of argument are compounded, they conduce to 
investments in reconceptualizing the individual in other than individualistic terms. 
There are many forms which such reconceptualization might take - ecological, social 
structural, and social evolutionary among them. However, specifically invited by 
social constructionist metatheory, is the social reconstitution of the individual. That 
is, within the many dialogues making up the constructionist movement, the social is 
given primacy over the individual. Significant attention is given, for example, to 
language, dialogue, negotiation, social pragmatics, conversational positioning, ritual, 
cultural practice, and the distribution of power. As earlier advanced, constructionist 
theorists are scarcely obliged to reinstantiate a constructionist metatheory in their 
scientific/scholarly accounts of the world or persons. In this respect the metatheory 
dictates nothing. However, because constructionist metatheory implies an alternative 
to the individualized conception of human action, there is good reason for exploring 
its potentials in developing more social or relational accounts of the person. In effect, 
the third constructionist orientation to the psychological world is to reconstitute it as 
a domain of the social. 
Of course, attempts to conceptualize the individual as a social actor have long been 
fixtures on the intellectual landscape (see Burkitt's 1991 review). Current 
constructionist attempts must be viewed as extensions of this tradition. At the same 
time, there are important differences among current theorists, differences with respect 
to their affinity to central constructionist tenets. For analytic purposes it is useful to 
consider a continuum of conceptualizations, varying in terms of their congeniality 
with traditional individualism and its close alliance with empiricist metaphysics as 
opposed to the primacy of relationship implicit within constructionist writings. Let us 
first consider the more conservative pole. Characterized by a deep respect for existing 
traditions, we find conceptualizations of the social self which 1) place a strong 
emphasis on specifically psychological states or processes, 2) presume the reality of 
their subject matter (beyond cultural premises), 3) rely on or attempt to establish 
foundations for further exploration and understanding, 4) treat the language of 
analysis as correspondent with nature, and the concomitatant role of the 
scientist/scholar as informant to the culture, and 5) treat the scientific/scholarly effort 
as politically/ideologically neutral. For purposes of comparison and evaluation, let us 
first consider social reconceptualizations retaining such traditional tendencies. 
Individuals as Cultural Carriers 
The nativist-environmentalist binary, around which most of the major debates in 
psychology have revolved over the century, furnishes the germinating context for the 
one of the most important attempts at socially reconstituting the self. That persons are 
influenced by their cultural surrounds has virtually served as a theoretical truism for 
psychology. This was most obviously the case during the hegemony of behaviorism, 
but even the nativistically oriented cognitivists have been unable - lest they sink on 
the shoals of solipsism - to abandon this conceptual mooring. Yet, the manner in 
which social reconstructions of the individual have extended this tradition form a 
dramatic disjunction with both behaviorist and cognitivist formulations. In both these 
cases the strong presumption prevails that the individual is endowed with certain 
psychological structures or processes. For the behaviorist the environment may 
stimulate or inform the internal conditions; for cognitivists the external conditions 
provide raw resources for cognitive appropriation. In neither case is the mental 
fundament itself produced, extinguished or transformed. It is precisely this move that 
characterizes a range of recent attempts at social reconstitution. As it is variously 
reasoned, it is not the self-contained individual who precedes culture, but the culture 
that establishes the basic character of psychological functioning. 
Not only does this family of attempts benefit from the environmentalist tradition, but 
in most cases significant linkages are forged with theories from psychology's past. 
For example, Bruner's highly influential work (1990) draws sustenance from 
Vygotsky, Bartlett, Mead, and a host of other significant psychological figures in 
proposing that "it is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, 
that gives meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an 
interpretive system." (p. 34) In contrast, James Gee (1992) squeezes support from 
myriad linguistic and cognitive contributions to argue that "the individual interprets 
experience by forming 'folk theories,' which together with nonlinguistic modules of 
the mind, cause the person to talk and act in certain ways..." (p. 104) Related attempts 
to "socialize" the self have drawn significantly from George Kelly (Neimeyer and 
Neimeyer, 1985), Freud (Freeman, 1993), and object relations theory (Mitchell, 
1993). 
For illustrative purposes, let us consider Harre and Gillett's (1994) comprehensive 
account of the individual as cultural carrier. Although specifically disavowing 
dualism, the hypothetico-deductive program, and laboratory experimentation, the 
volume rapidly moves on to discuss the nature of psychological states and conditions. 
"Concepts," we learn, are "the basis of thinking, and are expressed by words." (p.21) 
Further, "we must learn to see the mind as the meeting point of a wide range of 
structuring influences..." (p. 22) The authors then proceed to describe processes of 
thought, "cognitive systems that can cope with the complexity and variety of real-
world experiences..." (p. 79), the individual as an agent of his/her actions, experience, 
and perception The reality of these various processes is never in question, nor is their 
function in dealing with "the world as it really is...not just as one might wish it to be." 
(p. 49) Further, a full chapter ("Discourse and the Brain") is devoted to linking these 
mental processes to neural networks. Discussion of brain function serves the 
additional function of lodging the analysis in "established knowledge," that is, giving 
it foundations. It is the avowed effort of the volume to establish the basis for a 
"second cognitive revolution." That the analysis is attempting to illuminate the truth 
of human functioning is a supposition never subjected to reflective scrutiny. 
Throughout, the authors position their own discourse as truth carrying, with the 
reader interpellated as unenlightened audience. Nor is the volume viewed as 
ideologically invested. Its primary aim is to inform the reader of the nature of human 
action, to "make the main tenets and some of the research results of discursive 
psychology easily available." (p. viii). 
These varying attempts to conceptualize individual process as derivative of social 
process represent an important step toward refiguring psychology's conception of the 
person. And, while many constructionists find this explanatory orientation still too 
conservative, its very resonance with the preceding tradition may serve as its most 
important rhetorical asset. The views are innovative, but not radically disruptive; they 
invite existing intelligibilities and skills into dialogue rather than undermining them; 
they are collaborative rather than condemning. Is there reason, then, for seeking 
alternatives to the metaphor of individual as cultural carrier? Many would argue 
affirmatively. By their very familiarity, such orientations run the risk of full 
absorption into the existing traditions. They too easily become candidates for 
empirical evaluation, with such assessment implicitly reinforcing a dualist 
metaphysics that must, in the end, eschew these very conceptions. For the 
metaphysics of empirical assessment presumes the existence of a scientist who can 
claim truth beyond culture, comprehension beyond "folk psychology," universality 
rather than historicity. If these theories of mind as cultural carrier are candidates for 
truth, then they must in the end, necessarily be falsified. 
This is not the only reason for pressing the boundaries of intelligibility past the view 
of persons as cultural carriers. On the conceptual level, these views leave difficult 
problems unanswered. The paramount question, as to how cultural understandings 
can be acquired by the individual, remains theoretically intractable. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Gergen, 1994, Chpt.5), the problem is insoluble in principle. If mental 
process reflects social process, then the acquisition of the social must proceed 
without benefit of mental processing. If mental process is required in order to 
understand the social, then the mental must precede the social. The social view of the 
individual collapses. Further, many constructionists find such accounts insufficiently 
reflexive, not only by virtue of the hierarchies created in their claims to authority, but 
in their insensitivity to the ethical and political implications of their work. Alternative 
revisionings of the person are thus invited. 
Individuals as Culturally Immersed 
A second and smaller family of social reconstitutionalists is less obviously linked to 
the traditional assumptions of the field. Focal attention shifts in this case from 
expositions of psychological process itself to characterizing self within ongoing 
relationships, from internal residues of cultural experience to ongoing social process 
from which individual functioning cannot be extricated. In such accounts, the self-
other (individual/culture) binary is virtually destroyed. For theorists of this stripe, 
traditional psychology offers few conceptual resources (selected offerings of Harry 
Stack Sullivan and of Vygotsky notwithstanding); other traditions must be located. 
For example, Edward Sampson draws significantly from both Wittgenstein (1953) 
and Bakhtin (1981, 1986) in arguing that "all meaning, including the meaning of 
one's self, is rooted in the social process and must be seen as an ongoing 
accomplishment of that process. Neither meaning nor self is a precondition for social 
interaction; rather, these emerge from and are sustained by conversations occurring 
between people." (p.99) In his development of a "rhetorically responsive" view of 
human action, Shotter (1993) expands the range of relevant contributions to include 
Vico, Valosinov and Garfinkel. Shotter is concerned with the way "responsive 
meanings are always first 'sensed' or 'felt' from within a conversation, ...and amenable 
to yet further responsive (sensible) development"." (p.180). 
In this context, Hermans and Kempen's (1993) volume, The dialogical self, meaning 
as movement, provides an instructive contrast to the Harre and Gillett analysis. The 
extensive accounts of mental process in the latter work can be compared with the 
sotto voce analysis of mind in Hermans and Kempen. For example, for these authors, 
emotions are "rhetorical actions," and agency is a byproduct of participation in a 
dialogic relationship. This more sparing account of mental process is a congenial 
companion to muted realism. The authors are also sensitized to the function of 
metaphor in guiding their theoretical account (pgs. 8-10), acknowledging that their 
discussion of mental process is based on the metaphor of the narrative (Chpt. 2). 
Eschewing the attempt to furnish foundations, they propose that "The main purpose 
of this work is to bring together two familiar concepts, dialogue and self, and 
combine them in such a way that a more extended view of the possibilities of the 
mind becomes visible."(p.xx) And, while occasionally weaving data into their 
analysis, their use of evidence is not intended to finalize the discussion. Rather, "we 
want to present some empirical explorations that serve as illustration of our more 
extensive theoretical and conceptual discussions." (p.xx) 
Hermans and Kempen do little to articulate the social/political consequences of their 
account; they are far more invested in the contribution their work makes to the 
academic community than to the more general ethos of politics. More telling here are 
Sampson's (1993) and Shotter's (1993a) societal sensitivity. Sampson's analysis is 
specifically dedicated to a "celebration of the other," and the potential of such a 
formulation for undermining power and reducing suppression. Shotter (1993a) is 
deeply concerned with the political dimension of everyday interaction, and with 
using psychology to give marginal voices a broader space of expression. 
The Relational Constitution of Self 
Although a dramatic contrast to traditional psychological theorizing, and 
substantially more congenial with constructionist metatheory, there is yet a third 
orientation more radical than cultural immersion formulations. As indicated, 
constructionist metatheory traces ontological posits to language, and language to 
processes of relationship. By implication, all that may be said about mental process is 
derived from relational process. If this view is pressed to its extreme, one is invited 
explore a terrain of theoretical intelligibility in which mental predicates never 
function referentially, and social process serves as the essential fulcrum of 
explanation. That is, we may envision the elimination of psychological states and 
conditions as explanations for action, and the reconstitution of psychological 
predicates within the sphere of social process. Such a possibility is made particularly 
salient by the kinds of historical and cultural inquiries into conceptions of the mental 
discussed above. If one accepts the historical and cultural relativity of psychological 
discourse suggested by these writings, then one resists resting a contemporary 
formulation on particular presumptions about psychological functioning. More 
bluntly, one might resist reconstituting the individual as a social being in the fashion 
of the preceding accounts, as they attempt to ground themselves in universal or 
transcultural ontologies of the mind. 
An opening to a de-psychologized account of human action is forged within 
contemporary discourse analysis. In many of these writings, the analyst does not 
presume the ontology implied by discursive conventions, including the ontology of 
mind. In Potter and Wetherell's (1987) ground breaking work, for example, the 
concept of "attitude" is shorn of mental referents, and is used to index positional 
claims within social intercourse. Billig's (1990) essay on memory focuses on the way 
in which people negotiate the past as a replacement for the traditional emphasis on 
inner processes of memory. Or as Shotter (1990) proposes, memory is a "social 
institution."3 Edwards and Potter's Discursive Psychology represents a significant 
attempt to replace cognitive with discursive processes in explaining human 
interchange. Stenner and Eccleston's (1994) account of the "textualization of being" 
also resonates with this line of argument. 
Perhaps the most fully explicit attempt to wed this form of theorizing to a 
constructionist metatheory has been my own (especially Gergen, 1994). While owing 
an enormous debt to the preceding works, the attempt in this case has been to place 
the primary emphasis on relational pattern more generally. Thus, while focally 
concerned with discourse, the attempt is to theorize more fully enriched patterns of 
relational performance (including bodily activities of the participants, along with 
various objects, ornaments, and physical settings necessary to render these 
performances intelligible). In this sense, discourse is often central to the analysis, but 
spoken or written language does not exhaust the spectrum of concerns. Further, on 
this account, psychological terms are not exclusively used in processes of personal 
attribution (i.e. constative), but are often critical elements of performance itself 
(performative). 
To clarify, consider the case of emotion. Emotion terms (e.g. anger, love, depression) 
may serve as key elements of conversation, and the attribution of emotions to self and 
others of primary significance in social interchange. I have found it more useful, 
however, to consider emotional performances more holistically (Gergen, 1994, 
pgs.210-235). This means viewing linguistic expressions as possible but not essential 
components of actions that may require patterns of gesture, gaze, bodily orientation 
(and possibly physical artifacts or a locale) to achieve their intelligibility. Here my 
initial debt is largely to Averill's (1982) work on emotional performances. However, 
the attempt is to press beyond the individual performance to consider the patterns of 
interchange within which the performance is embedded, and without which it would 
constitute cultural nonsense. The term "relational scenario" thus indexes reiterative 
patterns of interchange (lived narratives) in which "psychological performances" play 
an integral role. Thus, for example, the performance of anger (complete with 
discourse, facial expressions, postural configurations) is typically embedded within a 
scenario in which a preceding affront may be required for its expression to acquire 
meaning; the performance of anger also sets the stage for the subsequent occurrence 
of an apology or a defense; and if an apology is offered; a favored response to an 
apology within the western scenario is forgiveness. At that juncture the scenario may 
be terminated. All the actions making up the sequence, from affront to forgiveness, 
require each other to achieve legitimacy. This form of analysis also applies to other 
forms of psychological performance (see for example, Gergen, 1994a, for a relational 
account of memory). 
Unlike much discourse analysis (and the bulk of conversation analysis) this account 
does not place a strong emphasis on evidential grounds. The goal of truth is 
eschewed, and objectivity as the research desideratum is replaced with intelligibility. 
This does not eliminate my positioning of the reader as "unknowing," but it does 
render my account vulnerable as "knowing." In effect, the intelligibility of the 
account cannot be achieved without the assent of the reader. Further, most discursive 
analysis is terminated in the act of representation; similar to traditional research, the 
action implications (if any) are left for the reader to determine. Consistent with 
constructionist metatheory, and its emphasis on the use-value of language, my own 
attempt has been increasingly to press past the printed page to locate or develop 
relevant cultural practices. For exmple, if certain emotional scenarios are inimical to 
the participants' well-being, how can they intelligibly alter the familiar course of 
action? The attempt, then, is to extend the use-value of the theoretical discourse to 
patterns of daily life (see,for example, McNamee and Gergen, in press). And while 
much (but not all) discursive work is politically neutral, the present account is 
explicitly set against individualist ideology and related practices. 
While these attempts to reconstitute the self as relational are more radical than the 
preceding alternatives, in the end we must also recognize their limitations. On the one 
hand, many scholars find them sufficiently dislocating that grafting them to more 
recognized (and professionally acceptable) pursuits is prohibited. On the other 
extreme, the more sociologically inclined argue that such accounts are far too micro-
social. One may indeed reinscribe "the mind" as a collective phenomenon, arguing 
that reason, memory and the like are broadly distributed within organizations or 
cultures (see for example, Douglas, 1986). Still others will find these orientations far 
too elitist. The analyses are intelligible only to an academically privileged. Finally, 
the strong emphasis on relationships is viewed as inimical to the important values 
inherent in the individualist tradition (e.g. democracy, humanism, equality). 
Insufficient attention has been given to the positive character of the tradition that is 
otherwise placed in jeopardy. 
In Conclusion 
As we find, far from eliminating psychological inquiry, social constructionism 
functions generatively to expand and enrich its potentials. At the outset, the 
constructionist impetus toward denaturalization and reflection not only invites the 
scholar to see how his/her work contributes to the moral and political fabric of the 
culture, but to open the field to a broader range of intelligibility. Favored in 
particular, are forms of dialogue that linking the discipline with its cultural surrounds, 
mutually transforming intelligibilities in such a way that the discipline plays a more 
vital role in the society. Constructionist ideas also invite the scholar to consider the 
potentials in resuscitating and enriching the compendium of mental discourse. Given 
a keen concern with the moral and political context, the scholar engages in a forms of 
theoretical poetics that open the culture to new, forgotten or otherwise suppressed 
intelligibilities, and thus, new alternatives for action. Finally, we have seen how 
constructionist dialogues can stimulate the development of social alternatives to the 
traditional conception of the self-contained individual. In significant respects, these 
revisionings of the person are intended as resources for societal change. There is no 
necessary antagonism between constructionism and psychological inquiry. Rather, 
informed by constructionist metatheory, there is reason to believe that psychology 
can play a far more vital role within society than heretofore. 
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